Giving Peace a Chance: The Construction and Validation of the Support for Diplomacy Scale

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Abstract

The Support for Diplomacy Scale (SDS) was developed to establish a measure of structural peacebuilding attitudes. Across five studies, all 12 items loaded strongly onto a single factor. Convergent, discriminant, and predictive validity was obtained against diverse hypothetically related measures of: political orientations (Studies 1, 2, 3, & 5); structural-level social issues (Study 2); social desirability bias, militarism, and moral disengagement from war (Study 3); specific pro-war policy against Iran (Study 4); and dogmatism (Study 5). Overall, the SPS demonstrated strong validity and reliability and was correlated with all hypothetically related measures in expected directions.
Giving Peace a Chance: Construction and Validation of the Support for Peacemaking Scale

We will not build a peaceful world by following a negative path. It is not enough to say we must not wage war…we must shift the arms race into a peace race. If we have a will – and determination – to mount such a peace offensive, we will unlock hitherto tightly sealed doors of hope and transform our imminent cosmic elegy into a psalm of creative fulfillment.

- Martin Luther King, Jr., Nobel Lecture, 1964, para. 34

Over the past several years, an exciting new trend has emerged within social psychology whereby researchers have begun to express interest in the investigation of factors that promote peaceful intergroup relations. Whereas there exists a healthy investigation and objective measurement of the hostile attitudes and behaviors that appear in various social interactions, comparatively little attention has been given to increasing the quantity and improving the quality of peace-oriented measurement instruments. In this respect, Christie, Tint, Wagner, and Winter (2008, pp. 540) have lamented, “The lack of knowledge about the psychology of peace reinforces a faulty assumption that peace is precarious, unusual, short-lived, or fragile and that the true state of human affairs arises from deep-rooted urges for aggression, which sooner or later give rise to violence and war.”

Accordingly, embedded within the enormous literature on aggression, hostility, militarism, and war-making, we find many measures of attitudes toward killing and war-making as it manifests in foreign and domestic policy, yet only a burgeoning collection of measures of the active negation of these attitudes as they manifest in promotion of political diplomacy and international peacebuilding. The current work will attempt to expand this collection, with the intent to aid the expansion of subsequent research opportunities, by delimiting support for (and
lack of support for international diplomacy as a unique expression of peaceful attitudes. We begin by reviewing select extant measures of militarism, war-making, non-military political violence, moral disengagement, and nonviolence and peaceful activism. Next, we introduce the concept of Support for Diplomacy as an expression of structural peacebuilding attitudes. We follow this with four studies systematically linking diplomacy attitudes to various related social and political constructs, demonstrating its divergence from social approval biases, and linking it to specific domestic and foreign policy.

WAR AND PEACE: PRIOR MEASURES

*Militaristic Attitudes and War.* One of the earliest and most impressive measures of militaristic attitudes was developed by Droba in 1931. Using an elaborate construction method, Droba pilot tested hundreds of statements by having students rate them from 1-10 according to the degree of militarism or pacifism. Then, taking these items scaled scores, he composed a mass of 44 items evenly distributed by their scaled militarism ratings. Participants subsequently responded to the scale by marking a plus or minus next to the randomized items, which were then scored by adding the scaled values of each item to get a measure of general militaristic attitudes. This method, although impressive and thorough, no doubt fell out of favor as generalizability would have been extremely difficult due to geopolitical scaling differences and rapid history effects.

Myers and Bach (1974) studied group polarization by dividing participants into groups of doves and hawks based on their responses on a 9-item role-play measure. The measure asked participants to imagine they were Presidential Advisors, presented 9 separate scenarios, and used 3 semantic differential scales to assess militarism as an index of willingness to deploy American troops in each scenario. Many of Myers and Bach’s scenarios were highly contextualized with
the political climate of the 1970’s. Nelson and Milburn (1999; c.f., Nelson, 1995; see also, Mayton, Peters, & Owens, 1999), on the other hand, sought to develop a more generalized measure of militarism. They compiled a set of 11 items dealing with generalized militaristic attitudes measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale \((1 = strongly agree, 5 = strongly disagree)\), including statements such as, “Our country should be engaged constantly in research to develop superior weapons for our national defense.” Other researchers have used variations of this scale in several contexts (Cohrs, & Moschner, 2002; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielman, 2005a).

Still another approach, however, was taken by Pyszczynski et al. (2006, Study 2) in their investigation of factors that contributed to support for extreme military solutions abroad. These researchers created four items measuring support for such radical actions as preemptive strikes, the use of nuclear and chemical weapons to defend American interests abroad, and the killing of thousands of civilians in efforts to capture Osama bin Laden. This instrument made broad reference to threats to the American way of life, thereby becoming applicable to any number of conflicts. This instrument was later revised to carry five additional items that directly assessed the willingness to wield the American military in an uncompromisingly warlike quest to destroy terrorists throughout the world (Weise et al., 2008, Study 2).

Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich, and Morgan (2006) also conducted a study investigating support for supposed counter-terrorism related military confrontations. Their instrument consisted of a single item measuring support for the expansion of the War on Terrorism to states suspected of harboring or supporting terrorists. Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Bolea, Koches, and Kauffman, (2004) devised a 22-item Likert-type scale pertaining to American responses to terrorism along five factors: aid to Afghanistan; seeking understanding for the
attacks; increased surveillance and detention; attacking terrorists and those harboring them; military force against Afghanistan.

Additionally, militarism has been measured with respect to specific conflicts, with instruments tending to vary considerably in length, scope, and content. Longino (1973), for instance, devised a 6-item scale built around the Vietnam War to assess how male students’ attitudes toward war might change depending on whether they draw a high or low draft number. Items on this scale ranged in extremism, from “use nuclear weapons and win the war once and for all,” to, “get out of Vietnam altogether (immediately).”

Federico, Golec, and Dial (2005) also measured support for military action by assessing the impact of need for closure, nationalism, and patriotism on attitudes toward military action directed against Iraq. In this study, six items were used that required endorsement of one of two opposing ideas in the form of questions such as, “Should the United States rely on diplomatic pressure to contain Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq or should it take military action to force Saddam from power?” Each item on this instrument consistently and explicitly centered on Iraq and mentioned some context relevant implication of military action the United States could potentially take. Terrizzi and Drews (2005) also measured attitudes toward Operation Iraqi Freedom, using eight Likert-type items such as, “Military force was the only practical way of solving the conflict in Iraq.” Still others have measured specific attitudes toward wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Cohrs, & Moschner, 2002; Cohrs et al., 2005a; Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006; McFarland, 2005). These measures generally consisted of three or four Likert-type items dealing with participants’ attitudes concerning the justification, conduct, and resolution of these specific conflicts.
Rothschild (2008) developed a rather clever method of measuring militarism in the context of war against Iran (c.f., Motyl, Hart, and Pyszczynski, 2008; Vail, Motyl, Arndt, & Pyszczynski, 2009). These researchers presented a role-playing paradigm where participants were asked to imagine themselves as the President of the U.S.A. and to respond to various security dilemmas knowing that as a result some innocent civilians would be killed. The instruments’ 11 dilemmas measured support for American military actions in response to various contingencies surrounding the Iranian government’s behaviors such as, “if Iran threatens to attack one of its neighboring countries,” or “if clear evidence indicated that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon.” The remaining content of this timely measure centered on some of the controversies that dominated political rhetoric and news coverage of the 2008 American-Iranian tensions.

Although the abovementioned instruments have no doubt facilitated useful insights into factors that contribute to the endorsement and justification of military endeavors such as war and aggressive counterterrorism, several issues remain concerning the use of these measures for the study of peace psychology. Almost all of these measures are subject to rapid history effects. Earlier measures have since seen drastic changes in globalization and nuclear capabilities. Others focus on concluded conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Kosovo, or center around impermanent contemporary military actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the War on Terrorism. Additionally, generalized measures of militarism do not indicate the inverse of support for peace, a point to be elaborated later.

Non-military Political Violence. Prior research has also investigated various factors contributing to support for violent non-military political actions. Hirschberger and Ein-dor (2006) examined attitudes toward violent resistance to the 2005 Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Northern West Bank. In their first study, these researchers developed a seven-item
instrument designed to assess perceived legitimacy and willingness to engage in various forms of violent resistance. These items included behaviors such as physically violent confrontations with soldiers and officers, and blocking traffic with burning tires. Their second study expanded this instrument to 12 items by adding five items specifically suited to violence in the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Pyszczynski et al. (2006, Study 1) investigated the effect of existential threat on support for anti-American martyrdom missions among students living in Iran. These researchers developed a student peer-review paradigm to examine pro- and anti-martyrdom attitudes. In this study, participants were given two sets of questionnaires ostensibly completed by “fellow students.” These questionnaires were actually completed by the researchers prior to the participant’s arrival; one condemned killing and martyrdom attacks against the United States while the other claimed that the United States was an enemy of Allah and should be destroyed via martyrdom attacks. Participants were then asked to indicate how much they liked, agreed with, and respected each “fellow student.” While these instruments provide interesting methods of examining important psychological processes, they remain rather graphic measures of support for violent political endeavors.

*Moral Disengagement.* Whereas the above instruments measure direct support for warmaking and violent political resistance, there also exists a set of psychological-process oriented instruments that deal with the disengagement from the moral sanctions against violence and killing. Working within a moral disengagement paradigm, Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, and Pastorelli (1996) have established a 32-item measure of activation of the mechanisms of moral disengagement. Their instrument taps a total of eight mechanisms: a.) moral justification, b.) euphemistic language, c.) advantageous comparison, d.) displacement of responsibility, e.) diffusion of responsibility, f.) distortion of the consequences, g.) dehumanization, h.) and
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attribition of blame. This measure centers on moral issues like stealing, fighting in the classroom, and mistreating others. Using a subset of these items, Aquino, Reed, Thau, and Freeman (2007) have recently reported that moral disengagement is positively related to support for killing terrorists by any means necessary.

In apparent contrast to these measures of moral disengagement, Grussendorf et al. (2002) have developed and validated a measure of resistance to moral disengagement among students from 21 countries around the world. This 10-item measure assesses one’s resistance to the mechanisms of moral disengagement through disagreement with items such as, “I will accept the use of our armed forces when foreign conflicts endanger our economic security.” Instruments such as this represent the spirited interest within the field to investigate the factors and processes involved in halting violence and stepping toward peace. The explicit measures of moral disengagement processes dovetail nicely with the following measures of nonviolence and peace activism in building an array of instruments suited to measuring specific aspects the person relevant to the psychological understanding of the advancement of peace.

Nonviolence and Peace Activism. As one might also suspect, fighting might not stop through a mere lack of support for war, but through active opposition to warmaking and a conscious desire to establish peace. Despite a rather young literature on peacemaking strategies and policy support, we find several noteworthy measures of support for peace and justice, many recently reviewed in Mayton, et al. (2002). As concerns nonviolent personalities, Hasan and Khan (1983) developed a 29-item Gandhian Personality Scale, comprised of six factors: machiavellianism, authenticity, cynicism, openness to experience and tolerance, tenderness, and trust in fellow humans. Johnson et al. (1998) also presented a Multidimensional Scale of Nonviolence measured along six factors: direct nonviolence, institutional nonviolence, compassion, indirect
nonviolence, environmental respect, and spirituality. As Mayton et al. note, however, validation efforts for these measures lack certain psychometric information, such as internal consistency or external reliability and validity.

With regard to nonviolent attitudes and behaviors, the 55-item Pacifism Scale (Elliot, 1980) was developed to reflect physical and psychological nonviolence components as well as a component of active nonviolent values and goals. A related measure, the Nonviolence Test, developed by Kool and Sen (1984), set out to build an index of nonviolence based on the idea that nonviolent persons have more self-control, exhibit anti-punitiveness, and equal distribution of justice. The Nonviolence Test might essentially be construed as a measure of tendencies toward nonviolent conflict resolution strategies. Mayton et al. (1998; 1999) also provide a Nonviolence Test designed specifically for youth samples. Their Teenage Nonviolence Test contains 51 items across 5 subscales: physical and psychological nonviolence, satyagraha and tapasya (holding to nonviolence and truth), and helping/empathy. As identified by Mayton et al. (2002), these measures all fit within the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence and involve “more than just a means for conflict resolution; [they encompass] a way of life in which individuals confront problems and find peaceful resolutions” (pp. 344).

Additionally, Brown et al. (2008) have recently developed the Just Peacemaking Inventory (JPI). Measured on an interpersonal level and derived from religious principles, the JPI identifies 20 pertinent items across five domains of personal interventions and peace activism: a.) economic sustainability, b.) responsibility and forgiveness, c.) threat reduction, d.) conflict resolution, e.) and non-violent direct action. Items include statements such as, “I engage in protest and collaborative actions against practices relied on by groups that violate human rights” and, “I support the use of tax dollars as relief funds for Iraqi and Afghani civilians.” These scales
no doubt substantially expand the possibilities of psychological research on factors influencing support for peace and justice. Yet, given the breadth of peace psychology (Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008), these extant instruments hardly represent a comprehensive account of its many aspects.

DIPLOMACY

Following our review of the war- and peace-making measures, we find a need for a subtle, thorough, yet general measure of support for peaceful attitudes in an international context. Certainly, the many abovementioned instruments have helped make valuable contributions to a complex understanding of the psychological processes behind war-making. However, some are rather graphic measures of hostile intergroup relations and/or foreign policies (e.g., referencing dead civilians and nuclear/chemical weapons) whereas others may be considered subtle measures (e.g., inquiring about overarching concepts such as the War on Terror). Additionally, one must take into account the intended purposes of extant war and peace related instruments; in light of their respective specificity and recent changes in the geopolitical scenery, we find it highly unlikely that some of these measures could be reasonably adapted for research in other regions of the world. Several of the abovementioned instruments relate to particular crises or conflict or are not easily adapted for further application in Western samples (i.e., concluded military conflicts, martyrdom missions, etc.). And finally, despite the emergence of several laudable nonviolence and peaceful activism scales, we find a comparative lack of internationally, diplomatically oriented measures of peaceful attitudes. We shall now attempt to lay out some criteria for at least partially filling this gap.

As concerns intergroup relations, we find a need for a measure of support for international diplomacy and peacemaking efforts. In doing so, we would seek to maximize applicability and
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research opportunity by developing a general measure that refrains from mentioning a specific
conflict, enemy, or cause for peace. In this respect, we feel a measure of Support for Diplomacy
would serve as a useful vehicle for the peaceful attitudes we wish to capture. In fleshing out a
definition for this construct, we first echo the emerging distinctions between three specific types
of peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding (Wagner, 2006; Christie, 2006;
Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008). *Peacekeeping* is generally understood as the
containment or de-escalation of violent conflict and the physical separation of the conflicting
parties. *Peacemaking* refers to attempts to resolve violent conflict through arbitration, mediation,
or negotiation. *Peacebuilding* is generally described as the proactive healing and prevention of
violent conflict through the establishment of conditions that attenuate or eliminate the bases of
social injustice and violent conflict. As noted by Christie (2006) and Wagner (2006), both
peacekeeping and peacemaking may indeed be essential components of peace, but neither
effectively addresses the underlying causes of current or future conflict. However, both
recommend peacebuilding as an effective means of dealing with the structural bases of violence,
proactively building a constructive, durable environment of peace.

Following these distinctions, we can now further engage distinctions made between direct
and structural peace. Direct peace is an immediate attempt to address a specific episode of
conflict; structural peace, on the other hand, entails the implementation of peace through
relatively permanent alterations to the norms and social predicaments that deprive people of a
nonviolent, conflict-free environment. Thus, to the extent that international diplomacy invokes
peacebuilding on the structural level, we define Support for Diplomacy as a unidimensional
convergence of systemic, structural, nonviolent peacebuilding. A measure addressing such a
construct would expand research opportunities available to Peace Psychologists, thereby heeding
Dr. King’s call that we focus on international diplomacy and peaceful attitudes in order to “shift the arms race into a peace race” (1964, para. 34).

**STUDY 1**

The current study seeks to establish a politically and socially tuned Support for Diplomacy Scale (SDS). In order to establish the existence of the unidimensional construct of support for diplomacy, we compiled a pool of items that focus on structural, diplomatic methods of international peacebuilding. Assuming that such a unidimensional construct indeed exists, we hypothesized a single factor solution would emerge.

Further, as is common practice, we included theoretically related dispositional measures of social and political belief in an effort to establish construct validity. We first added a measure of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) based on contentions that RWA represents a narrow constellation of enduring beliefs that represent motivational goals of security, social cohesion, and conformity (Altemeyer, 1998; Cohrs, Kielmann, Maes, & Moschner, 2005; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005b). The RWA literature provides solid evidence that authoritarians view the world as a dangerous place, and are willing to support nearly any authority-sanctioned means (i.e., war, capital punishment, prejudice/discrimination, etc.) as a means of protecting the in-group from threatening out-group members or other social deviants. With respect to the SDS and the underlying structural peacebuilding attitudes we expected a negative relationship with RWA, as authoritarianism has been repeatedly associated with generalized militaristic and violent attitudes, as well as support for the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (A. Benjamin, 2006; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005a; Heaven, Organ, Supavadeeprasit, & Leeson, 2006; McFarland, 2005).
We also included a brief measure of political orientation. Given that the structure of RWA lacks information and specificity concerning low scores, we felt that a measure of political orientation should provide additional accuracy concerning the description of any correspondence between high SDS scores and low RWA scores. That is, we expected high SDS scores to correspond to liberal political orientation. And to the extent that RWA measures conservative ideology, we expected low scores on the SDS to correspond to conservative political ideology, just as it should correspond to high RWA.

Method

Participants

Data were collected during in-person testing sessions from a total of 115 psychology students at a mid-sized western university. Participants were given extra course credit in exchange for their time. The final sample included 64 females and 51 males with a mean age of 21.83. Twenty-two participants reported Republican party affiliation, 38 reported Democratic party affiliation, 12 reported affiliated with “Other”, and 43 were unaffiliated. All students received extra credit in exchange for their participation upon completion of the survey packet.

Materials and Procedure

Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was greeted by an experimenter and briefed on the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent, were given a materials packet, and were instructed to respond to each question in the order presented honestly and openly. Upon completion, the experimenter thanked and dismissed each participant.

Development of the Support for Diplomacy Scale. A pool of 12 items dealing with the diplomatic promotion of peace, human rights, and the prevention or abolition of war was
compiled according to the definitions of structural peacebuilding provided by Wagner (2006), Christie (2006), and Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter (2008). Two expert judges, who were not involved in the present research, unanimously agreed that all items fit the definition of structural peacebuilding and were all focused on the systematic alleviation of international conflicts through the diplomatic promotion of peace. Each item was then assigned an 11-point Likert-type scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 11 = *Strongly Agree*). A single line preceded the measure, instructing participants to “Read each item and indicate your response on the scale by selecting the number that most accurately represents the way you feel.”

*Right-Wing Authoritarianism.* The RWA scale was used to measure fundamentalist belief (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). The scale assessed individual levels of RWA using a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = *very strongly disagree*, 9 = *very strongly agree*). These items included such statements as, “The ‘old fashioned ways’ and ‘old fashioned values’ still show the best way to live,” and “Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the ‘rotten apples’ who are ruining everything.”

*Political Orientation.* A single item measure of political orientation was included to further establish the relationship between the SDS and self-reported conservative vs. liberal political ideology. The item simply asked participants to indicate their political orientation on a 6-point likert-type scale (1 = *Extremely conservative*, 6 = *Extremely liberal*).

Results and Discussion

The pool of items composing the SDS were then entered into a principal axis factor analysis to establish the internal validity of the overall scale. Principal axis factoring extracted a single factor solution, retaining all 12 items. The SDS rendered an eigenvalue of 6.02, explaining a total of 45.79% of variance within the scale. A complete report of item-factor loadings may
also be found in Table 1. Further, the SDS yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .91, demonstrating adequate internal reliability.

Importantly, sex did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, \( r(113) = -0.12, p = .90 \). Females scored virtually the same (\( M = 6.66, SD = 0.98 \)) as males (\( M = 6.64, SD = 1.26 \)). A Pearson correlation revealed that age is also unrelated to peacemaking attitudes, \( r(115) = .08, p = .44 \). In order to examine construct validity, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between the SDS and each measure of RWA and political orientation. As hypothesized, a negative correlation emerged between the SDS and the RWA scale, \( r(115) = -0.28, p = .01 \), indicating that high scores on RWA accompany low support for diplomacy. The SDS was also positively correlated with a liberal political orientation, \( r(115) = .39, p < .001 \), suggesting that a liberal political orientation is accompanied by higher SDS scores and that conservative political ideology is accompanied by lower support for peaceful diplomacy.

The SDS demonstrated satisfactory psychometric properties. Principal axis factor analyses initially revealed the SDS to be a strong, parsimonious measure of support for structural peacebuilding. Additionally, initial construct validity was found using RWA and political orientation. Rigid right-wing social ideology was shown to predict a lack of support for diplomatic, systemic peacebuilding. In a similar vein, political conservatism was related to a decrease in SDS; however political liberalism related to increased support for such peacebuilding. While Study 1 successfully established the internal validity and reliability of the SDS, as well as preliminary construct validation, further evidence is needed to more clearly expose the psychometric properties of the scale and further explore the construct of diplomacy attitudes. Therefore, a second study was conducted to test the replication of the factor structure and reliability of the scale, as well as to expand upon its hypothetical construct validity.
STUDY 2

In setting out to expand the construct validity of the SDS, we sought to explore social and political variables that similarly assess attitudes toward related norms and social predicaments operating on the structural level. We first turn toward those attitudes that reflect a propensity toward intergroup conflict. As a host society, America has maintained an historical ambivalence toward its immigrant populations; Oyamot, Borgida, and Fisher (2006) report poll data indicating Americans are often narrowly divided on whether immigrants are a blessing or a curse. Using a measure ranging from sympathetic to hostile attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies, Motyl, Rothschild, Vail, Weise, & Pyszczynski (2009) further report that anti-immigrant attitudes indeed extend to an association with other measures of prejudice (anti-Arab) and even violent conflict and military extremism. Therefore, to the extent that anti-immigrant attitudes reflect a structural propensity for intergroup conflict we expected to observe a negative relationship with the SDS.

We expected a similar relationship between the SDS and universalist orientation. Prior research of such orientations have characterized universalism as the general tendency to respect and value the similarities and differences between the self and ingroup/outgroup members (Henderson-King, et al., 2004). A universalist outlook has been shown to be negatively correlated with political conservatism and RWA, and positively correlated with sympathetic attitudes toward immigrants, environmental conscientiousness, and, perhaps most importantly, anti-nuclear activism and peaceful responses to terrorist activity (Henderson-King, et. al., 2004; Mayton & Furnham, 1994; Motyl & Vail, 2009). Therefore, as high scores on the SDS may be interpreted as the desire to relieve foreign and domestic peoples of the burdens of violent conflict, universalism is expected to positively relate to SDS scores.
We also sought to examine fundamentalist religious belief as it relates to diplomacy attitudes. Studies on religious fundamentalism (RF) found associations with stiffer punishments when sentencing moral transgressors, prejudice against homosexuals, and sexist attitudes toward women (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger, Owasu, & Duck, 1999; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001). Further, studies have demonstrated relationships between RF and other measures of general prejudiced or discriminatory attitudes (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). Other studies report that RF is associated with violent attitudes. Nelson and Milburn (1999) found that RF was correlated with aggressive militaristic attitudes and opposition to gun control. Similarly, Henderson-King, et al. (2004) reported that RF correlated with an increased desire to deploy military force in response to terrorist activity. Thus, given that religious fundamentalists tend to be more prejudiced and militaristic, we expected RF to negatively correlate with the SDS.

Finally, we also wanted to see whether our measure would extend to other social attitudes that are generally considered unrelated to war/peace attitudes. We thus chose to include measures of environmental conscientiousness on the basis that although such attitudes are politically charged, they operate on the structural level—involving an understanding of systemic contributions to environmental abuse. We formed a tentative hypothesis concerning environmentalism through the knowledge that environmental conscientiousness, specifically with regard to global climate change, has been shown to be positively correlated with political liberalism and the perception of an interconnected humanity; in contrast, it is negatively related to political conservatism, RWA and RF (Vail & Motyl, 2008a; 2008b). Thus, we formed a tentative hypothesis that the structural peacebuilding attitudes underlying the SDS would correlate positively with similarly structural environmentally conscientious attitudes.
Method

Participants

Data were collected from 231 psychology students (40 male) at a mid-sized western university via an online sign-up system. Notably, participants were non-traditional students ranging in age from 18 to 58 years ($M = 22.48$, $SD = 5.89$) at a mid-sized western commuter college. All were granted extra course credit upon completion. When asked to report their political affiliation 79 respondents reported being Republican, 59 Democrat, 25 “Other”, and 68 “Not affiliated”

Materials and Procedure

Data were collected via an online survey system. Each participant was informed of the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent before proceeding to the materials section. Upon completion, each participant was thanked and granted extra course credit.

Support for Diplomacy Scale. As study 2 also sought replication of the factor structure of the scale, the 12-item SDS was included without alteration (see Table 1). All items were assigned a 10-point likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 10 = Strongly Agree). Again, a single line preceded the measure, instructing participants to “Read each item and indicate your response on the scale by selecting the number that most accurately represents the way you feel.”

Immigration Attitudes. The Immigration Attitudes Questionnaire (IAQ; Motyl, Rothschild, Vail, Weise, & Pyszczynski, 2009) was used to assess individual levels of hostility toward immigrants and continued immigration. The IAQ was measured using an 11-point Likert-type scale and included statements like, “American citizens should be allowed to use lethal force
to keep illegal immigrants out of our country,” and “Legislation should be enacted that puts restrictions on all types of immigration into this country.”

*Ubuntuism.* A measure of the perception of a common humanity (PCH; Motyl & Vail, 2009) was included as a measure of universalism. Created in the African tradition of Ubuntu, this measure indicates the perception that all people everywhere share an interconnected, uniquely human existential predicament. Items on the PCH were measured using a 6-point Likert-type scale. Items included statements such as, “All people are linked to each other in a shared human bond,” and “When one member of a community suffers, the whole community suffers.”

*Religious Fundamentalism.* The shortened version of the RF scale was used to measure fundamentalist belief (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004). Twelve items assessed individual levels of RF using a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = *very strongly disagree*, 9 = *very strongly agree*). These items included statements such as, “God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must totally be followed,” and “To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion.”

*Environmental Attitudes.* The Global Warming Assumption of Responsibility Scale (GWARS; Vail & Motyl, 2008a) measures the willingness to take responsibility for having helped create the problem of global warming as well as for dealing with it. The GWARS included such statements as, “The problem of global warming will not be solved unless I take action.” Also included was a measure of support for public policies and legislation designed to combat global warming, the Global Warming Policy Scale (GWPS; Vail & Motyl, 2008b), and a measure of Global Warming Behavioral Intentions (GWBIS; Vail & Motyl, 2008b). The GWPS included such items as “Legislation should be enacted that puts restrictions on all greenhouse gas emissions.” The GWBIS asked participants to rate their willingness to comply with 36 specific
alterations to their lifestyle that would help reduce their contribution to the global warming trend. All three of these instruments were measured using a 10-point Likert-type scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 10 = very strongly agree).

Authoritarianism. The RWA scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) was again included to test for replication of the relationship between SDS and the submissive authoritarianism. Additionally, we included the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) scale to measure the power-seeking aspects of authoritarianism. The SDO and RWA scales have been shown to measure distinct, yet related constructs among many different types of people.

Political Orientation. Finally, a single item measure of political orientation was again included to test for replication of the relationship between the SDS and conservative and liberal political ideology. The item measured political orientation on a 6-point likert-type scale (1 = Extremely conservative, 6 = Extremely liberal).

Results and Discussion

To test for replication of the SDS factor structure found in Study 1, the 12 items of the SDS were entered into a principal axis factor analysis. Again, the factor analysis extracted a single factor solution retaining all 12 items. The SDS yielded an eigenvalue of 7.06, explaining a total of 55.30% of the variance within the scale. A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1. Further, the SDS rendered a Cronbach’s alpha of .94, indicating satisfactory internal reliability.

Again, sex did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, t(229) = -0.40, p = .69. Females scored virtually the same (M = 6.74, SD = 1.56) as males (M = 6.85, SD = 1.73). A Pearson correlation revealed that age was unrelated to peacemaking attitudes, r(231) = .09, p = .19. This
is an important point, in that the lack of a significant relationship across a wide age range of non-traditional students helps establish validity and reliability within a more general population, outside the context of traditional university students.

In order to further establish construct validity, Pearson correlation validity coefficients were calculated between the SDS and each of the various other measures. As predicted, a negative correlation was observed between the SDS and the IAQ, $r(231) = -.38, p < .001$, indicating that hostile attitudes toward immigrants and immigration policies are associated with low support for diplomacy and likewise that high SDS scores were associated with sympathetic attitudes toward immigrants. Additionally, a positive correlation emerged between the SDS and the PCH scale, $r(231) = .42, p < .001$, indicating that the increased perception of a common humanity interconnecting all humans generally accompanies an increased support for American peacemaking abroad. The expected negative correlation was observed between the SDS and the RF scale, $r(231) = -.29, p < .0001$, indicating that increased religious fundamentalism is associated with low support for peaceful international policies. Also, the SDS displayed a positive correlation with the GWARS, $r(231) = .63, p < .001$, the GWPS, $r(231) = .66, p < .001$, and the GWPIS, $r(231) = .51, p < .001$, suggesting that increased support for peacemaking is indeed related to increased willingness to take responsibility for global climate change, and to increased support for public policies and actions designed to combat global climate change. Negative correlations again emerged between the SDS and both the RWA scale, $r(231) = -.40, p < .001$, and the SDO scale, $r(231) = -.49, p < .001$, suggesting that rigid right-wing social ideology and belief in group-based hierarchies strongly predict decreased support for American peacemaking efforts. The relationship between the SDS and political orientation was also replicated, $r(231) = .42, p < .001$, where political liberals were more supportive of diplomacy but
political conservatives were not. A complete report of inter-scale correlations may be found in Table 2.

In Study 2, the SDS displayed strong psychometric properties. Principal axis factor analyses replicated the factor structure of the SDS found in Study 1, reinforcing the internal validity of the 12-item scale. A large Cronbach’s alpha (.94) added to the evidence for internal reliability. Moreover, evidence for the measure’s construct validity was gathered. The SDS was shown to correlate positively with willingness to accept responsibility for global warming, support for public policy and actions designed to combat global warming, and the perception of a common humanity; conversely, the SDS was shown to negatively correlate with hostile immigration attitudes and religious fundamentalism. We also replicated Study 1 by again finding that SDS was negatively related to conservative political orientation and RWA, but also with SDO. Overall, Study 2 successfully replicated evidence for the internal validity and reliability of the SDS, as well as significantly expanding evidence for construct validation. However, so far there remains a possibility that SDS scores may be influenced by social desirability response biases. Further, given that our primary interest is with measuring support for diplomacy as an expression of structural peacebuilding attitudes, we have yet to investigate the ability of the SDS to predict specific attitudes toward war, militarism, violence-related cognitive processes, structural-level geopolitics, or peace activism. We therefore set out to address these issues with Study 3.

STUDY 3

As previously eluded to, it is possible that the relationships found in Studies 1 and 2 are the result of social desirability biases. To the extent that support for international diplomacy has become a trendy way to garner social approval, several of the relationships observed may have
been inaccurately represented. Given the nature of the SDS content and its correlates so far, we suspected that social desirability response biases are not playing a significant role. Nevertheless, we decided to test for such a relationship.

Next, we turned toward an investigation of the SDS’s ability to predict militaristic attitudes. As developed by Pyszczynski et al (2006; and revised by Weise et al., 2008), the military might scale (MMS) is designed to assess support for extreme military solutions abroad via attitudes toward such radical violence as preemptive military strikes, the use of nuclear and chemical weapons to defend American interests abroad, and the killing of thousands of civilians in efforts to capture Osama bin Laden. We expected the SDS would negatively correlate with such violent militaristic attitudes.

We were also interested in examining possible cognitive processes related to SDS. Specifically, Grussendorf et al. (2002) provide a suitable means of investigating moral disengagement processes in the context of war. Their instrument assesses the degree to which respondents disengage from the moral proscriptions against killing and war through the use of a combination of moral justification, euphemistic language, advantageous comparison, displacement of responsibility, diffusion of responsibility, distortion of the consequences, dehumanization, and blaming the victims. We thought it highly unlikely that those scoring high on moral disengagement would also support systemic, structural, non-violent peacebuilding via the SDS. We therefore expected to observe a negative relationship between the two constructs.

We also found ourselves in the serendipitous position of being able to test the SDS for predictive validity against perhaps the most unequivocally relevant indices of structural peacebuilding: the 2008 Presidential election. With the focus of November’s General Election on the faceoff between Barack Obama and John McCain, we made several key observations
regarding the structural peacebuilding and diplomatic attitudes of each. First, McCain had been a long-time supporter of the bombing, invasion, and occupation of Iraq and has harshly characterized the wars critics. As concerns Iraqi peacebuilding, McCain has claimed that there is no alternative to the buildup of troops and fierce fighting (Gordon & Nagourney, 2007). In the months prior to the election, he had also renewed his hard-line views concerning Russia, saying he would be “very harsh,” looking to kick Russia out of the G-8 and rapidly incorporate former Soviet states into NATO in what were characterized in the press as moves reminiscent of former Cold War tactics intended to politically and economically isolate the nation and provoke military confrontation (M. Benjamin, 2008; “McCain: Russia deserves ‘harsh treatment’”, 2006). But more generally, he had famously joked about the prospects of bombing Iran and assured crowds of supporters that if he were elected, “there will be other wars” (Edwards & Brynaert, 2007; Stein, 2008). In contrast, from the beginning of his campaign Obama had loudly touted his record of opposition to the Iraq war and occupation, offering a plan for reconciliation led by UN and regional diplomats as well as advancing a humanitarian initiative to provide services and safe-haven to the estimated 2 million displaced Iraqi refugees (“Where Obama stands: On Iraq”, 2008). He repeatedly denounced war with Iran, stressing the importance of condition-free diplomatic endeavors in maintaining peace. He also campaigned not just for nuclear non-proliferation, but also for the aggressive dismantling and elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide (Zeleny, 2007). Given these considerations, we suspected that those scoring high on support for diplomacy and structural peacebuilding would support Barack Obama for President, but that those who were unsupportive of diplomatic, structural peacebuilding would tend to support McCain.
And finally, we turned specifically to the construct of peace activism. As we have previously reviewed, the Just Peacemaking Inventory (JPI) identifies 20 pertinent items across five domains of activist interventions and peace attitudes. We therefore expected the JPI to positively correlate with the SDS.

Method

Participants

Data were collected at a large mid-western university from 197 psychology students (49 male) with a mean age of 18.17 (SD = 1.37). All participants were granted extra course credit.

Materials and Procedure

Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was informed of the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent before completing the materials packet. Upon completion, each participant was thanked and granted extra course credit.

Support for Diplomacy Scale. The 12 SDS items were assigned a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 9 = Strongly Agree). Again, a single line preceded the measure, instructing participants to “Read each item and indicate your response on the scale by selecting the number that most accurately represents the way you feel.”

Social Desirability. A revised version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale was used to measure the extent to which participants are distorting responses in an effort to garner social approval (SAS; Short Form-C in Reynolds, 1982). The measure included 13 items utilizing a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 9 = very strongly agree). Items consisted of statements such as, “No matter who I am talking to, I’m always a good listener,” “I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake,” and, “I’m always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.”
Support for Diplomacy. The military might scale (Weise, et al., 2008, Study 2) was used to assess militaristic attitudes. The measure included 10 items utilizing an 11-point Likert-type scale (1 = very strongly disagree, 11 = very strongly agree). Items consisted of statements such as, “It is entirely appropriate to engage in pre-emptive attacks on countries (e.g., Iran, Syria, North Korea, etc.) that may pose a threat to the United States in the future, even if there is no evidence they are planning to attack us right now,” and “The only chance we have to stop international terrorism is if the United States follows a strict warlike and uncompromising approach to the problem.” Various other items reference using extremist methods such as nuclear or chemical weapons, or the killing of thousands of innocent civilians in order to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.

Moral Disengagement. The extent that a person will disengage from moral proscriptions against killing in a war context was measured using the resistance to moral disengagement scale (Grussendorf, McAlister, Sandstrom, Udd, & Morrison, 2002). This scale employed 10 items measured on an 11-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 11 = strongly agree). The first item statement read, “War is necessary to settle conflicts between countries.” Then, participants were asked to indicate when they might accept the use of armed forces via their responses to 9 separate situations, such as, “when there is not much risk for our soldiers,” and “when foreign conflicts endanger our economic security.”

2008 Presidential Election Voting Intentions. A candidate evaluation survey was designed to assess which major party Presidential candidate participants preferred. A single-item Voting Intentions scale read, “I will probably vote for…” measured on a 10-point Likert-Type scale (1 = John McCain, 10 = Barack Obama).
Activism. The Just Peacemaking Inventory (JPI; Brown et al., 2008) was used to assess individual levels of political activism. The JPI consists of 20 items across five domains of activism: a.) economic sustainability, b.) responsibility and forgiveness, c.) threat reduction, d.) conflict resolution, e.) and non-violent direct action. Items were measured using a 11-point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 11 = strongly agree) and included statements such as, “I engage in protest and collaborative actions against practices relied on by groups that violate human rights,” and, “I am part of a small group of people who meet regularly to advocate for those not in our immediate community.”

RWA and RF. The same measures of right-wing authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) used in studies 1 and 2 were again included in study 3 to test for further replication of the previously observed relationships.

Results and Discussion

We again tested for replication of the SDS factor structure found in Studies 1 & 2 by entering all 12 SDS items into a principal axis factor analysis. Again, the factor analysis extracted a single factor solution retaining all 12 items. An eigenvalue of 4.48 was obtained, explaining a total of 32.01% of the variance within the scale. A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1. The SDS also rendered a Cronbach’s alpha of .84, indicating satisfactory internal reliability.

Again, sex was not significantly associated with scores on the SDS, $r(195) = -0.35, p = .72$, as females scored virtually the same ($M = 6.55, SD = 1.02$) as males ($M = 6.49, SD = 1.24$). A Pearson correlation revealed that age is also unrelated to peacemaking attitudes, $r(197) = .04, p = .56$. In order to further establish the construct of support for peacemaking and diplomacy, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between the SDS and each of the seven other
measures. As predicted, the SDS did not correlate significantly with the SAS, $r(197) = .11, p > .12$, suggesting that the SDS is not being systematically biased by a desire to garner social approval. Further, using simultaneous regression techniques controlling for social desirability, the SDS remained negatively associated with militaristic attitudes ($\beta = -.62, t(196) = -10.92, p < .001$), moral disengagement processes ($\beta = -.28, t(196) = -4.02, p < .001$), right-wing authoritarianism ($\beta = -.31, t(196) = -4.46, p < .001$), and religious fundamentalism ($\beta = -.28, t(196) = -4.01, p < .001$), and positively associated with voting intentions ($\beta = .40, t(196) = 6.13, p < .001$). Concerning the JPI, however, principle axis factor analysis failed to replicate the JPI’s original 5-factor solution; instead, all JPI items loaded positively onto a single factor (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .84$) to which the SDS remained positively associated while controlling for SAS ($\beta = .37, t(196) = 5.54, p < .001$). Social desirability was non-significant in each analysis, all $|\beta|$’s < .08, $|t|$’s < 1.04, $p$’s > .05. Further, while controlling for JPI scores, the SDS remained negatively associated with militaristic attitudes ($\beta = -.59, t(196) = -9.71, p < .001$) and moral disengagement processes ($\beta = -.13, t(196) = -3.14, p < .01$), and was positively associated with voting intentions ($\beta = .36, t(196) = 5.08, p < .001$). The JPI, however, became non-significant in each analysis, all $|\beta|$’s < .13, $|t|$’s < 1.8, $p$’s > .05. A complete report of inter-scale correlations may be found in Table 3.

The SDS again displayed strong psychometric properties and replicated the factor structure and internal validity and reliability of the scale. More importantly however, Study 3 obtained evidence for both its divergent and predictive validity, further reinforcing the measure’s construct. We found evidence that the construct of support for diplomacy is not related to social desirability biases. Controlling for social desirability, we also found evidence connecting support for diplomacy with low militaristic attitudes, a resistance to moral disengagement processes,
peace activism, and even specific instances of structural peacebuilding in a highly relevant context—the 2008 US General election. These data confirm that the structural peacebuilding attitudes measured by the SDS do indeed translate to specific outcomes. In this case, people scoring high on the SDS behaved as predicted, by expressing an intention to vote for the candidate emphasizing peace on a broad, structural, platform-wide scale—Barack Obama. Likewise, people scoring low in the SDS behaved as predicted, expressing intention to vote for the candidate emphasizing an aggressive, hard-line, militaristic foreign policy—John McCain. We also further replicated the effects of Studies 1 and 2 by finding the SDS was negatively related to RWA and RF. We next replicated the positive association between the SDS and voting intentions, and the negative associations of the SDS with militaristic attitudes and moral disengagement while controlling for Just Peacemaking attitudes. We then sought to extend the evidence for the predictive validity of the SDS by exploring its relationship to very specific attitudes toward American war-making policy concerning the very real potential for violent conflict with Iran.

STUDY 4

Consistent with our working definition of SDS and our accumulated findings so far, we expected that support for diplomacy would correlate negatively with a hawkish stance regarding the American-Iranian tensions and the prospect of war.

Method

Participants

Data were collected from 70 psychology students (35 male) at a large mid-western university. All participants were granted extra course credit upon completion.

Materials and Procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, each participant was informed of the purpose and procedure of the study. All participants provided their informed consent before completing the materials packet. Upon completion, each participant was thanked and granted extra course credit.

**Support for Diplomacy Scale.** A single line preceded the measure, instructing participants to “Read each item and indicate your response on the scale by selecting the number that most accurately represents the way you feel.” The 12 SDS items were assessed using a 9-point likert-type scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree*, 9 = *Strongly Agree*).

**Support for war against Iran.** We made use of Rothschild’s (2008) role-play measure of attitudes toward making war with Iran. This measure asked participants to, “Imagine that you are Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It is your job to decide when to use your national armed forces (army, navy, and air force) knowing that, as a result, some innocent civilians are likely to be killed.” Participants were instructed to use a 10-point likert-type scale to respond to each of 11 items following the initial sentence stem “I would support using our armed forces against Iran…” (1 = *definitely yes*, 10 = *definitely not*). The eleven items included statements such as, “If Iran blatantly disregards the international community,” and “If clear evidence indicated that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon.”

Lastly, a single-item measured political orientation on a 9-point Likert-type scale (1 = *Liberal*, 9 = *Conservative*).

**Results and Discussion**

The 12 SDS items were again entered into a principal axis factor analysis, which again extracted a single factor solution retaining all 12 items. An Eigenvalue of 6.22 was obtained, explaining a total of 47.96% of the variance within the scale. A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1. The SDS yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .91, suggesting sound
internal reliability. Again, sex did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, \( t(68) = -0.51, p = .61 \). Females scored roughly the same \((M = 7.13, SD = 2.18)\) as males \((M = 6.90, SD = 1.61)\). Pearson correlation coefficients revealed that the SDS was negatively correlated with willingness to go to war with Iran, \( r(70) = -0.39, p = .001 \). Political orientation was also significantly related to willingness to go to war with Iran, \( r(70) = -0.33, p = .006 \). However, when support for war against Iran was simultaneously regressed on both SDS and political orientation, the SDS remained a significant predictor \((\beta = .30, t(68) = 2.17, p = .03)\) but political orientation did not \((\beta = -0.15, t(68) = -1.11, p = .27)\). These findings suggest that the SDS extends to uniquely cover attitudes toward specific episodes regarding the escalation of potentially violent conflict. Overall, Study 4 supported the SDS’s internal validity and reliability, again displaying strong psychometric properties as well as expanding evidence for predictive validity.

**STUDY 5**

The previous studies demonstrate the consistent single-factor structure of SDS replicated four times on four different samples collected at different universities and through different mediums (e.g., laboratory vs. internet). Thus, the present study aims to confirm the factor structure using a confirmatory factor analysis. The study also aims to further examine how voting behavior and political identification are related to scores on the SDS. Furthermore, the present study will also provide more evidence of construct validity by again examining the relationships between SDS, RWA, SDO, RF. Additionally, this study also looks at the relationship between attitudinal extremism, as measured by the content-free dogmatism scale (Altemeyer, 1996), and SDS. Past research has demonstrated that extremist, dogmatic modes of thinking correspond with heightened support for war and intergroup aggression (Granberg & Corrigan, 1972; Karabenick & Wilson, 1969). Thus, we hypothesize a negative relationship
between SDS and dogmatism such that people who are more dogmatic in their thinking should be less supportive of structural peacebuilding.

*Participants*

Data were collected from 161 non-traditional students (119 female, 38 male, 4 did not respond) ranging in age from 18 to 52 ($M = 25.35$, $SD = 6.48$) at a mid-sized western commuter college. Of these, 55 indicated that they were registered Republicans and 48 were registered Democrats. The remaining 58 consisted of 13 third-party voters and 45 not registered citizens. All participants received extra credit for their participation.

*Materials and Procedure*

Participants completed the survey using an online subject recruitment database. Participants completed the same 15-item Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Pratto & Sidanius, 1994), the 20-item Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer, 1998), and the 12-item Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) as used in Studies 1-3. In addition, participants completed the 22-item Dogmatism scale (Altemeyer, 1996) which assesses the extent to which people view their beliefs as absolutely correct independent of the content of their beliefs. This 9-point Likert-type scale includes items such as “The things I believe in are so completely true, I could never doubt them” and “People who disagree with me are just plain wrong and often evil as well.” Lastly, participants indicated how they voted in the 2008 U.S. Presidential election (Obama or McCain), political affiliation (Republican or Democrat), sex, and age.

*Results and Discussion*

The 12 SDS items were entered into a confirmatory factor analysis, which again extracted a single factor solution retaining all 12 items. An Eigenvalue of 7.66 was obtained, explaining a
total of 63.84% of the variance within the scale. A complete item-factor loading report may be found in Table 1. The confirmatory factor analysis supports the hypothesized single-factor solution and suggests that it is an excellent fit of the data, CMIN/DF = 2.40, CFI = .95, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .06. The SDS yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .95, suggesting satisfactory internal reliability once again.

Again, sex did not significantly affect scores on the SDS, \( t(155) = -0.03, p = .97 \). Females scored virtually the same \( (M = 6.60, SD = 1.65) \) as males \( (M = 6.61, SD = 1.97) \). A Pearson correlation between SDS and age, also suggests that age is unrelated to SDS scores, \( r(161) = .06, p = .20 \). Again, the lack of a systematic relationship across a broad age range of non-traditional students helps to bolster the SDS’s claims of validity and reliability beyond the university context.

In order to further establish the construct of support for peacemaking and diplomacy, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between the SDS and each of the other measures (see Table 4). As predicted, the SDS displayed a negative correlation with the dogmatism scale, \( r(161) = -.38, p < .001 \), suggesting that increased support for diplomacy is accompanied by decreased dogmatic thinking. Additionally, negative correlations emerged between the SDS and RWA \( (r[161] = -.57, p < .001) \), SDO \( (r[161] = -.49, p < .001) \), and RF \( (r[161] = -.34, p < .001) \), replicating the patterns reported in Studies 1 through 3. Independent samples t-tests looking at SDS scores of Republicans and Democrats, McCain and Obama supporters were conducted. Party affiliation significantly predicted scores on the SDS, \( t(101) = -8.07, p < .001 \). Democrats were significantly more supportive of using peaceful diplomacy \( (M = 7.97, SD = 1.36) \) than Republicans \( (M = 5.75, SD = 1.42) \). Similarly, voting behavior significantly predicted SDS scores, \( t(120) = -7.83, p < .001 \). People who voted for Barack Obama were significantly more
supportive of peaceful diplomacy ($M = 7.69, SD = 1.57$) than people who voted for John McCain ($M = 5.63, SD = 1.33$). Overall, Study 5 supported the SDS’s internal validity and reliability, again displaying strong psychometric properties as well as expanding evidence for predictive validity.

**General Discussion**

We initially defined Support for Diplomacy as the unidimensional convergence of systemic, structural, nonviolent peacebuilding. Thus far, this definition appears to be an accurate one. Across five studies, item-factor loadings for each item were sufficiently strong, averaging .67, .74, .56, .68, and .78, respectively. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficients were also consistently strong (.91, .94, .84, .91, and .95 respectively), suggesting that the SDS is a highly reliable measure of systemic, structural, nonviolent peacebuilding attitudes.

Initial construct validation was obtained by finding a consistent negative relationship between the SDS and authoritarianism, ideological dogmatism, conservative political orientation, and religious fundamentalism. Convergent validity was also obtained against other constructs such as immigration attitudes, environmental conscientiousness, and the perception of a common humanity. Throughout these analyses, we found evidence suggesting the SDS is indeed a measure of systemic, structural nonviolence. In Study 3, we found evidence that SDS is not related to social desirability bias. The remainder of the analyses were devoted to the investigation of predictive validity. As was expected, the SDS was found to be positively related to peace activism, voting intentions, and prior voting behavior. Additionally, the SDS was negatively related to militaristic attitudes, disengagement from the moral proscriptions against killing in the context of war, and the specific prospect of war against Iran, even when controlling for such measures as Just Peacemaking and political orientation.
The SDS also boasts brevity, consisting of just 12 items. This renders it an excellent instrument for use in time-constrained research situations, as is sometimes the case with priming research or street polling. Given the precedence of measures of war-making, militarism, and political violence, the availability of the SDS will hopefully spur research on peace and diplomacy in the various fields surrounding intergroup relations. Further, whereas low SDS scores could be interpreted as something similar to a militaristic attitude, the SDS differs markedly from other measures of war/militarism in that it is explicitly oriented toward structural peacebuilding attitudes according to the theoretical framework of Wagner (2006) and Christie (2006). In contrast, low scores on other measures of war/militarism do not represent the specific construct of structural peacebuilding attitudes, but merely the lack of support for military endeavors.

The current research has included a grand total of 774 (213 male) participants, more than adequate for development of a 12 item scale (Comrey, 1988; DeVellis, 2003; Tinsley & Tinsley, 1987). Additionally, the current research includes roughly half laboratory-data (Studies 1, 3, & 4; 372 participants) and half online-data (Studies 2 & 5; 392 participants). Further, the SDS relationships with other scales (i.e., RWA, SDO, RF) were successfully replicated across data collection methods, suggesting that the online data collection method was just as accurate a method as the closely controlled laboratory data collection method. Whereas Studies 2, 3, and 5 remain plagued by the deficit of male participants all too common among psychology student research pools, we found evidence in all five studies that sex did not affect SDS scores.

Additionally, all five studies were conducted using college students as participants. As it is, our focus was on constructing and validating the SDS among university populations because they represent a reasonable population for which to assess the basic operations of the measure
and because educated persons are often those wielding more political and military power. Initial evidence for the modest generalizability of the SDS was obtained from Studies 2 and 5, which replicated the factor structure, validity, and reliability of the SDS across large samples of non-traditional students at commuter colleges ranging broadly in age from 18 to 58 years. Nevertheless, future research could focus also on validating the SDS among non-student populations, such as military servicemen and servicewomen, social workers, healthcare professionals; minorities, veterans, retirees, etc.

We now turn to various remaining statistical issues. Most pressing is the unidirectional scoring of the scale items. All 12 items of the SDS are forward scored, leaving it vulnerable to acquiescence response sets, which could potentially inflate internal consistency and reliability. Considering this vulnerability, readers should exercise caution when interpreting each study’s reliability coefficient. Additionally, access to the presented participant pools was such that test-retest reliability could not be examined, however such analyses would certainly be informative. Future research should therefore make an effort to balance the scale and explore the measure’s test-retest reliability.

Attentive readers may also have noticed the use of several ranges of Likert-type scales on the SDS. Study 1 used an 11-point scale, Studies 2 and 5 used a 10-point scale, and Studies 3 and 4 used a 9-point scale. While this difference has little importance concerning the construct of SDS, it bears methodological implications. When using an odd numbered scale range, participants are offered a “neutral” middle ground; but when presented with an even numbered scale range, they are forced to make a decision on a response that either leans toward the high or low pole of the scale.
Further, the SDS as currently presented measures perspectives on American peacebuilding. Whereas some researchers may find the current version of this scale useful in measuring non-American attitudes toward American diplomacy efforts, others may find this opportunity unattractive. Even after altering the scale to refer to other nations, some items will certainly still not apply to some non-American regions, such as farmers in India, students in Israel, or refugees in Darfur, among others. We do, however, suspect that the situations represented in the items of SDS would apply to several of America’s Western counterparts (i.e., United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, etc.).

Overall, the present research provides strong evidence that the SDS accurately measures structural, nonviolent peacebuilding attitudes. These findings may also help provide an opportunity to further the empirical study of Peace Psychology by establishing a theoretically grounded instrument with adequate convergent, divergent, and predictive validity. Along the way, these findings also add to the literature by showing that structural peacebuilding, as measured by the SDS, is related to diverse social, political, and religious constructs that may afford insight into opportunities for the promotion of peace and nonviolence.
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Appendix A

Table 1

Support for Peacemaking Scale and item-factor loadings.

**Instructions**: Read each item and indicate your response on the scale (1 = *Strongly Disagree* to 11 = *Strongly Agree*) by circling the number that most closely represents the way you feel.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Study 1</th>
<th>Study 2</th>
<th>Study 3</th>
<th>Study 4</th>
<th>Study 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fewer people will suffer if the United States aggressively pursued peaceful diplomacy instead of aggressively using its military.</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Frequent communication between countries is the best way to resolve conflicts.</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The United States should follow international agreements banning torture, even if it makes collecting intelligence more difficult.</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The best way for the United States to address the problem of terrorism involves increasing cultural sensitivity in troubled areas around the world (e.g., the Middle East, Africa).</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Leaders of the United States should actively engage in diplomatic efforts with the leaders of states who sponsor terrorism.</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. In order to improve security within the United States,</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
States, the U.S. must improve its image throughout the world.

7. To address the problem of terrorism, the United States’ best choice is to use diplomacy.

8. If the U.S. wants peace, it must set a peaceful example.

9. The best way for America to improve its image is to use its technological and economic advantages rather than its military might.

10. If our leaders advocate violent solutions, they can only expect more violence in return.

11. Diplomatically addressing the reasons that terrorists attack America is more urgent than militarily fighting them.

12. America’s strong military showing undermines its peaceful goals.
Table 2

Inter-scale correlations of measures included in study 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>IAQ</th>
<th>GWR</th>
<th>GWPS</th>
<th>GWBI</th>
<th>Political Orientati on</th>
<th>PCH</th>
<th>RWA</th>
<th>SDO</th>
<th>RF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.63***</td>
<td>.66***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>.42***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAQ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>.22***</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-.20**</td>
<td>-.37***</td>
<td>-</td>
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Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table 3
Inter-scale correlations of measures included in study 3.

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<th>MMS</th>
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Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$. 

Table 4

Inter-scale correlations of measures included in study 5

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Note. *** p < .001.